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Different types of intention
The first distinction we need is provided by Searle (1983), and is 
that between prior intention and intention-in-action. Searle regards 
the intention-in-action (or motor intention) as the direct cause of an 
agent’s movement: the mental and causal component of the bodily 
movement of an action. To cover the overall conditions of an action 
one has to analyze also the prior intention, which orients the action 
as a whole. Prior intention is formed in advance, to represent goal 
states that may be quite distant from the chain of actions that lead 
to their fulfillment: prior intention represents the goal of the action 
before it is undertaken.
A schematic representation of the relation between motor and 
prior intentions is represented in Figure 1. This figure represents 
the causal chain from the point of view of the Actor, who is plan-
ning an action in order to achieve a goal. The causal chain has to 
be reversed from the point of view of the Observer, who first rec-
ognizes the Actor’s bodily movements, then her motor intention, 
and finally gets to attribute to her a prior intention (see Figure 2). 
In this paper we shall focus only on the recognition and attribution 
of prior intentions from a third person’s perspective.
prior intentions in the brain
An exhaustive classification of prior intentions is beyond the scope 
of this paper (for a wider analysis see Pacherie, 2000, 2006; Becchio 
et al., 2006). Figure 3 shows the three kind of prior intentions we 
have tested through fMRI.
Private intentions (PInt) require only the Actor to perform 
actions adequate to reach her goal (e.g., A intends to drink a glass of 
water). On the contrary, a social intention requires at least a Partner, 
who is necessary for the Actor to reach her goal (e.g., A intends 
paper’s goal
The aim of this paper is to analyze how empirical research, spe-
cifically neuroimaging studies, can address what have been tradi-
tionally thought as a philosophical question, i.e., the classification 
of different types of intention. The ability to recognize others’ 
intentions is essential for any social interaction. In order to study 
intentional minds, here we refer to the philosophical approach to 
intentionality (Searle, 1983) and to a cognitive science approach 
to communication (Bara, 2010).
Our strategy will be as follows. In Section “Different Types of 
Intention,” we present a taxonomy of intentions, derived essentially 
by philosophy of mind (here represented by Grice and Searle) and by 
cognitive pragmatics (Bara). In Section “Predictions for Intentional 
Minds of Healthy Individuals,” we propose a set of experimental pre-
dictions on the brain regions involved in processing the different kinds 
of intention presented in the taxonomy, based on the taxonomy itself 
and on evolutionary assumptions, as well as on our previously assessed 
neuroscientific results. In Section “Predictions for Intentional Minds 
of People with Schizophrenia” we introduce additional hypotheses 
based on published evidence on schizophrenia research. This allows 
us to generate further predictions to be tested on people with para-
noid schizophrenia, who show hyper-intentionality, i.e., assuming 
intentionality also where there is none. If people with schizophrenia 
have a hyper-intentional mind, people with autism may be consid-
ered hypo-intentional, as we shall discuss in Section “Predictions for 
Intentional Minds of Patients with Autism.” People with autism, as 
far as intentional processing is concerned, appear to be located at the 
opposite extreme than people with schizophrenia, and this allows the 
generation of a third set of predictions. Here our analysis will be based 
on a qualitative interpretation of our preliminary data.
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Tomasello (2008) is in principle similar to our social intention, 
but we go a step further. In our approach, the prototypical case of 
a social intention shared in the present is Communicative inten-
tion (CInt). CInt is the intention to communicate a meaning to 
someone else, plus the intention that the former intention should 
be recognized by the addressee (Grice, 1975; Bara, 2010). To be 
precise, A intends to communicate that p to B when A intends the 
following two facts to be shared by both A and B:
1.  That p.
2.  That A intends to communicate that p to B.
Making information achieve the status of sharedness does not 
mean one has communicated it. For instance, Anne can, in apparent 
distraction, leave on the table the keys of her Harley–Davidson, thus 
allowing Barbara to infer that Anne drives such a motorbike. Anne 
and Barbara now share the fact that Anne has a Harley–Davidson, 
but Anne can reasonably claim she has never communicated such 
piece of information to Barbara. The necessary condition for real 
communication to take place is that such information be intention-
ally and explicitly proposed to the interlocutor. For this reason, CInt 
possess the special feature of recursivity (Bara, 2010).
However, there are special intentions whose social goal lies in 
the future. For instance, Alice may intend to visit her father next 
Sunday. This kind of social intention involves the representation 
of a social goal when A and B are not actually interacting but B 
is part of A’s goal. We define this kind of intention Prospective 
social intention (PSInt). In the case of PSInt, the desired social 
interaction is not present at the moment, but if the PSInt will 
become shared in the future, then it will cause the social interac-
tion to occur.
According to Bratman’s (1987) account, the main characteristic 
of future-directed intention (as he prefers to call prior intention) is 
that the Actor does not only want to accomplish that intention, but 
she is also committed to do it. If Alice forms the prior intention to 
visit her father next Sunday, she is committing herself now to visit 
him on Sunday. Pacherie and Haggard (2010) call all kinds of prior 
intentions prospective intentions, because they have to be realized in 
a future moment. For the sake of simplicity, in this paper we reserve 
the term prospective intention only to social ones (PSInt), even 
though in principle also private intentions may be future-directed, 
e.g., Alice may now form the prospective private intention to give 
up smoking on her next birthday.
In the following sections, we show how we empirically tested 
the classification presented in Figure 3.
preDictions for intentional minDs of healthy 
inDiviDuals
Human beings are constantly involved in various types of social 
interaction. They cooperate; they compete; they communicate to 
construct the meaning of their interaction together; they acquire 
new skills by imitating other people; and they share knowledge, 
experience, and emotions. In fact, unlike other species, human 
beings have evolved the ability to regulate social interactions by rep-
resenting the intentions that motivate other people’s behavior. Yet, 
the complex nature of the interpersonal patterns in which we play 
an active part on a daily basis is frequently obscured by the apparent 
ease with which we manage to cope with such complexity.
One of the most currently debated issues is whether the cognitive 
and neural processes involved in perception, language, memory, 
and attention, actually suffice to account for the ways in which 
we conduct our social interaction, or whether we possess mental 
processes and neural structures that are specifically allocated for 
this purpose (Adolphs, 2003; Frith, 2007). Our approach follows 
this latter line of research and assumes that human beings have 
developed specific brain structures and cognitive mechanisms to 
cope with social complexity. These mechanisms make it possible to 
go beyond the surface level of other people’s behavior and infer the 
mental states which generate that behavior. Key abilities involved 
in these processes are: recognizing other individuals as being goal-
directed and intentional agents, and being able to share individual 
mental states in order to develop a common social space.
FIguRe 1 | The relation between prior and motor intentions, from first 
person’s perspective.
FIguRe 2 | The relation between prior and motor intentions, from third 
person’s perspective.
FIguRe 3 | Classification of the different types of prior intention.
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to test our predictions according to which the comprehension of 
social prior intentions specifically recruits the prefrontal areas of 
the ToM’s neural system, we devised an experimental protocol 
depicting intentions concerning agents in situations of both social 
interaction and isolation.
Thus, in a first fMRI experiment (Walter et al., 2004) we pre-
sented to healthy participants a series of comic strips (each one 
of them consisting of a sequence of three pictures) encompass-
ing both “social” and “non-social” stories, i.e., stories that refer, or 
not, to social interactions. This protocol allowed us to compare 
the activation of the brain in three different conceptual categories, 
corresponding with the following comic strip stories: (1) private 
intentions (PInt) stories, each of which depicts a private action 
performed by a single character with a private goal, and whose 
understanding requires the attribution of a private prior intention 
to the character involved; (2) CInt stories, each of which depicts an 
action performed by a character with a social goal that is shared 
with someone else in the present, and whose understanding requires 
the attribution of a CInt to the character involved; (3) physical 
causality (Ph-C) stories, a high-baseline condition that does not 
involve ToM abilities and whose stories depict a non-intentional 
causal sequence of events concerning objects, whose understand-
ing does not require the attribution of mental states to others. 
A fourth experimental condition (PInt-2) involving two agents 
acting independently (not involved in a social interaction) was 
introduced to control the number of persons involved in the story. 
The participant were required to choose among a set of three answer 
pictures the most appropriate and logical continuation of each 
story (see Figure 4).
In accordance with our a priori experimental hypothesis, the 
results of this experiment showed that the MPFC (in particular the 
anterior paracingulate cortex) was significantly activated in the CInt 
but not in the PInt condition. Thus, our results demonstrated the 
MPFC is activated only for the representation of intentions involved 
in social interaction. An alternative explanation for our results, 
namely the varying number of persons between the CInt and the 
PInt conditions, was ruled out by our control condition PInt-2: 
there was no MPFC activation in this condition (see Figure 5).
In order to comprehend to what extent the MPFC is specialized 
in the understanding of social interaction, we devised a second 
experiment (Walter et al., 2004). The objective of this experiment 
was to understand whether the MPFC is active not only in the 
presence of actual social interaction, such as communicative ones, 
but also when social interaction is not ongoing at the moment, i.e., 
when it is only potential. In fact, the results of the first experiment 
raised the following questions: to what extent can the MPFC activa-
tion we found be attributed to the specificity of the communicative 
interaction? Would the representation of a social goal not involving 
a CInt have resulted in similar activations? To answer these ques-
tions in the second experiment we introduced the PSInt condition 
(see Figures 3 and 4). In these comic strips a single character who 
is performing an action which was aimed at intended future social 
interaction is shown. Thus, the main difference between the CInt 
and the PSInt condition is that in the latter one the character is 
not involved in actual social interaction with another character. For 
example, a character preparing a romantic dinner.
Our predictions on the role played by different brain structures in 
comprehending intentions are based at first on the data according to 
which primates present a surprisingly large brain size, especially the 
prefrontal cortex, in proportion to body weight. Various hypotheses 
have been put forth to explain the evolution of this phenomenon. 
The most acclaimed states that the growth of brain volume is an 
adaptive trait primates developed in response to selective pressures 
imposed by their complex social systems (Humphrey, 1983). A spe-
cies’ social complexity has been shown to be a function of its social 
group size (Dunbar, 2009). Groups with greater social interaction 
require brains with a greater capacity to elaborate social information. 
Our species has both the highest index of social complexity and the 
largest prefrontal cortex (Dunbar, 1998; Semendeferi et al., 2001). 
Our hypothesis proposes that the natural selection has determined 
the evolution of a mechanism specifically specialized in comprehend-
ing mental states which guide people involved in social interaction. 
In particular, because of the assumed co-evolution of prefrontal 
cortex size and social relationships, we predict that prefrontal cortex 
is only recruited in understanding social intentions (i.e., PSInt and 
CInt). We believe that this specialized mechanism is one of the basic 
components of the theory of mind (ToM) ability, i.e., the ability 
both to attribute mental states different from our own to other 
individuals, and to predict and explain the behavior of others based 
on these mental states (Premack and Woodruff, 1978). Studies using 
neuroimaging methods showed the existence of a neural network 
underlying the ToM ability, including the right and left temporo-
parietal junctions (TPJ), the precuneus, and the medial prefrontal 
cortex (MPFC; Fletcher et al., 1995; Brunet et al., 2000; Ruby and 
Decety, 2003; Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Ciaramidaro et al., 2007; 
Gobbini et al., 2007; Enrici et al., 2011. For a review see Carrington 
and Bailey, 2009). Converging evidence comes from neurodegenera-
tive and brain lesion studies (e.g., Stuss et al., 2001; Apperly et al., 
2004; Adenzato et al., 2010; Poletti et al., 2011).
In performing our fMRI experiments our main predictions were 
threefold: (1) the MPFC areas involved in intention recognition are 
activated only in response to social stimuli requiring comprehen-
sion of social interaction, both present and future; (2) the posterior 
areas underlying intention recognition (TPJ and precuneus) might 
suffice for representing the mental states of agents, as long as those 
agents are acting outside social interaction; (3) the existence of a 
dynamic brain network encompassing the standard ToM regions, 
i.e., the right and left TPJ, the precuneus and the MPFC, each of 
which with a specific function depending on what type of prior 
intention is represented from an observed action.
experimental eviDence with healthy inDiviDuals
In these years research on the neural correlates of social cognition, 
defined as the set of cognitive processes subserving social behavior 
in response to conspecifics, are continuously increasing (Amodio 
and Frith, 2006; Van Overwalle, 2009). Within the realm of social 
cognition, special attention has been given to the study of the neural 
mechanism subserving ToM function. This trend of research has 
permitted the identification of the previously described areas of the 
brain which together permit the comprehension of the mental states 
of others, i.e., the TPJ, the precuneus, and the MPFC. Nonetheless, 
studies of the ToM’s neural correlates often have not taken into 
account that distinct areas of this system can be specialized in the 
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  February 2011  | Volume 5  | Article 7  |  3
Bara et al.  Intentional mindsFIguRe 4 | Activation paradigm. One trial for each experimental condition is shown. Red square indicates the correct answer.
FIguRe 5 | Main effects for the three experimental conditions (PInt, 
PInt-2, CInt) vs control condition (Ph-C). Second level, one sample t-test, 
p < 0.001 uncorrected. Ph-C, Physical causality; PInt, Private intention; PInt-2, 
Private intentions by two agents; CInt, Communicative intention.
The results of this second experiment replicated the results of the 
first one with a different and independent sample, i.e., the MPFC 
was significantly activated in the CInt condition but not in the PInt 
condition, and in this latter condition posterior brain areas showed 
to be sufficient to represent the mental states of agents acting out-
side a social interaction. Furthermore, the results showed for the 
first time that the MPFC is also engaged in the comprehension of 
intentions in which a social goal is not yet present but lies in the 
future, such as in PSInt condition (see Figure 6).
An interesting result we found is a pattern of activations in the 
MPFC (CInt > PSInt > PInt) that shows the possibility to parameter-
ize the dimension of “socialness” in performing fMRI experiments 
as recently recommended by Adolphs (2010; see also Figure 7).
Taken together, our experiments with healthy people showed 
that the MPFC is involved in the comprehension of the intentions 
involved in social interactions (such as CInt and PSInt) but not in 
the comprehension of intentions of a person acting outside social 
interaction (i.e., PInt).
The rationale of the Walter et al.’s (2004) experiments was that 
the crucial aspect in order to determine whether two different 
mental states (e.g., CInt and PInt) can be distinguished from a 
philosophical point of view, is the possibility to find separate neural 
activations corresponding to each of them, as in the case where the 
two mental states are processed in spatially distinct locations of the 
brain. At the same time, however, a large number of high order cog-
nitive functions are neuroanatomically distributed, especially the 
social cognitive ones (Tamietto et al., 2007; Adolphs, 2010; Botzung 
et al., 2010): this means that different brain regions are responsible, 
and work in concert, to process different aspects of the same func-
tion. For this reason in a subsequent work (Ciaramidaro et al., 2007) 
we proposed a model of a dynamic intentional network consisting of 
the bilateral TPJ, the precuneus, and the MPFC. Our hypothesis was 
that the intentional network shows different activation patterns in 
relation to the nature of the prior intentions participants are dealing 
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neural network underlying ToM is present only when participants 
were dealing with a shared in the present social intention, i.e., with 
CInt. This latter result implies a role for left TPJ in understanding 
CInt, a role we explained considering the well known role of the 
left hemisphere in communication processing.
In sum, our results show that whereas the right TPJ and the 
precuneus are necessary for processing all types of prior inten-
tions, the left TPJ and the MPFC are specifically involved in the 
understanding of social prior intention. More specifically, the left 
TPJ is activated only when social prior intentions occur in the 
present (i.e., CInt).
These results demonstrate the progressive recruitment of the 
intentional network along the theoretical dimensions presented 
in Section “Different Types of Intention.” In the next sections we 
will discuss further predictions that integrate our taxonomy with 
clinical evidence, and we test them in two clinical populations, i.e., 
people with schizophrenia and people with autism.
preDictions for intentional minDs of people with 
schizophrenia
As human beings we are equipped with the predisposition to 
attribute mental states to our conspecifics but not to non-living 
systems; when we see a person communicating with something 
that is not a living system we immediately register that something 
peculiar is happening with this individual. Patients with schizo-
phrenia have been shown to exhibit various dysfunctions in the 
domain of social cognition (Burns, 2004, 2006). In particular, 
ToM has constantly been found to be impaired in schizophrenia 
as summarized by two recent meta-analyses comprising 29 ToM 
studies including 831 patients (Sprong et al., 2007) and 36 ToM 
studies including 1181 patients (Bora et al., 2009), respectively. 
ToM dysfunction has been used to explain persecutory delu-
sions (Harrington et al., 2005), a key symptom of schizophrenia 
characterized by misattribution of intentions to others. It has 
been argued that patients with delusions of persecution over-
attribute causes to external events (Bentall et al., 2001) and may 
be characterized by hyper-intentionality, a specific attitude of 
paranoid patients which consists in over-attributing significance 
and intentions to events, persons, and objects. Abu-Akel and 
Bailey (2000) speak also about “hyper-ToM,” an attitude associ-
ated with quantitative over-generation of hypotheses or over-
attribution of mental states. Although paranoid patients seem 
to experience other people as possessing mental states, they are 
impaired in using contextual information, an impairment which 
induces them to make incorrect “online” inferences about others 
(Brüne, 2005).
Even though there is clear evidence for behavioral deficits in 
ToM tasks in schizophrenia (for review see Brüne, 2005), the exist-
ing studies do not distinguish among different types of mental 
states or intentions attributed. Also in the few neuroimaging studies 
investigating ToM in schizophrenia (reviewed in Brunet-Gouet and 
Decety, 2006) different types of intention were mixed within the 
same conditions, precluding any specific conclusion about the type 
of intentional process that might be disturbed. Furthermore, to our 
knowledge, no neuroimaging study has explicitly investigated the 
concept of hyper-intentionality in schizophrenia.
with. In particular, we predicted that the network becomes more 
extensively activated whenever people are trying to comprehend 
social intentions, i.e., PSInt and CInt conditions.
To test our prediction we extended our earlier results (Walter 
et al., 2004) by performing a new data analysis that focuses not only 
on the MPFC, but also on the precuneus and the TPJ bilaterally. 
This deeper level of analysis was based on signal time courses for 
the four regions of interest. We found the following main results: 
(1) only the right TPJ and the precuneus are recruited for the 
comprehension of private prior intentions (PInt); (2) the recruit-
ment of the right TPJ and the precuneus does not suffice when a 
person is dealing with a social intention to be shared in the future 
(PSInt); as hypothesized, it is the MPFC that plays a crucial role in 
FIguRe 6 | Main effects for the three experimental conditions (PInt, 
PSInt, CInt) vs control condition (Ph-C). Second level, one sample t-test, 
p < 0.001 uncorrected. Ph-C, Physical causality; PInt, Private intention; PSInt, 
Prospective social intention; CInt, Communicative intention.
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whether patients with positive symptoms have a “hyperactive 
intention detector” which is activated also by physical events. 
An exaggerated sense of agency seems to characterize patients 
with delusions of persecution, and this tendency to perceive 
agency where there is none may be a more general feature of 
schizophrenia (Frith, 2004). Blakemore et al. (2003) reported that 
patients with delusions of persecution, when observing simple 
animations, attributed intentionality to moving shapes in condi-
tions where healthy controls reported no intentional behavior. 
Therefore, we hypothesized that a similar process would happen 
in the Ph-C stories.
In our third experiment with schizophrenia patients our main 
predictions were threefold: (1) we expected to find significant 
impairments at the behavioral level since performance in attribu-
tion of intentions is reduced in schizophrenic patients (Brunet et al., 
2003) – the event-related design of the study allowed to analyze 
correct answers as well as reaction times; (2) we predicted to find 
a dysfunction in the network underlying ToM in terms of reduced 
brain activation in the intentional conditions, in particular for CInt, 
because these patients’ attitude of “over-attributing” intentions 
seems to be related to violations of pragmatic rules (Brüne, 2005); 
(3) we expected to find neural evidence for the above mentioned 
hypothesis that paranoid patients may have a hyperactive inten-
tion detector when they observe physical events, i.e., in our Ph-C 
condition they do not deactivate their intention detector.
experimental eviDence in people with paranoiD schizophrenia
Schizophrenia is a heterogeneous disorder with various symptom 
subgroups showing different degrees of mentalizing impairment. 
In particular, paranoid patients show ToM deficits because of their 
incapacity to monitor other people’s intentions (Frith, 1992; Frith 
and Corcoran, 1996; Corcoran et al., 1997). Patients with schizo-
phrenia show considerable deficits in social cognition but the 
results in the literature are inconsistent. Harrington et al. (2005) 
mentioned two factors that may explain these inconsistent data: 
variety of ToM tasks and presence of heterogeneous subgroups of 
schizophrenic patients included in the studies. For this reason it 
is recommended to design studies that involve only homogene-
ous groups of patients and to establish the psychometric proper-
ties of the ToM tasks used (Harrington et al., 2005; Sprong et al., 
2007). Therefore, we decided to include in our study (Walter et al., 
2009) only patients with paranoid schizophrenia. Using the same 
design with three types of intentions as in our previous studies 
described in Section “Predictions for Intentional Minds of Healthy 
Individuals,” we compared a group of 12 patients with a matched 
healthy control group. As already described, the participants’ task 
was to choose the one picture showing the logical ending of a 
story. Participants indicated their choice by pushing one of three 
buttons. Eleven comic strips were presented for each of the four 
conditions described in the Section “Experimental Evidence with 
Healthy Individuals.”
As expected, we found reduced accuracy and increased reac-
tion times for the patient group compared to the control group. 
However, the reduced performance included all four conditions, 
i.e., also the control condition (Ph-C). These results could have 
two explanations: (a) they reflect an unspecific impairment in 
Our model of a dynamic intentional network, described in the 
previous section, allows us to postulate different activation patterns 
in relation to the nature of the prior intentions that healthy partici-
pants are dealing with. Hence, these results legitimate us to employ 
this model in order to investigate the maladaptive attribution of 
intention in paranoid patients and permit us to examine whether 
their (possible) dysfunctional activation within the intentional 
network depends on the kind of prior intention involved (private 
or social). It has been pointed out that ToM deficits in schizophre-
nia might explain some of the communication problems of these 
patients (Frith, 2004). Paranoid schizophrenic patients make sig-
nificantly more mistakes on tasks that involve inferring the beliefs 
and intentions of the speakers (Tenyi et al., 2002). Langdon et al. 
(2002), using a picture sequence task, demonstrated pragmatic defi-
cits of expressive language and pragmatic deficits of comprehen-
sion, as well as an over-interpretation of linguistic and visual input 
in patients with schizophrenia (Langdon et al., 2002; see also Russell 
et al., 2000; Langdon and Coltheart, 2004). These results lead us to 
hypothesize differential dysfunction in the intentional network, in 
particular for CInt compared to other types of intentions.
In  addition,  our  experimental  model  is  also  indicated  to 
verify in schizophrenic patients “hyper-ToM” attitude to over-
attribute not only intentions to persons but also to objects: using 
FIguRe 7 | Statistical parametric map (SPM{Z}) of the between-condition 
effect [CInt > PInt; random effects analysis, ANOVA FDR corrected (0.05)]. 
The activation profile for the MPFC in all three conditions is shown in the 
lower part. The bars indicate effect size (mean of parameter estimates from a 
single-subject analysis) for the respective condition against control condition 
Ph-C. Bonferroni’s post hoc test was significant for all between-condition 
comparisons. Ph-C, Physical causality; PInt, Private intention; CInt, 
Communicative intention.
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network of paranoid patients are modulated by the different kinds of 
intention considered: paranoid patients show a reduced activation 
of the intentional network exclusively during the comprehension of 
social intentions. No alterations were found during the comprehen-
sion of private intentions. We suggest that these patients exhibit this 
atypical pattern of activation because they are not able to decouple, 
i.e., to distinguish between the inner mental world and the exter-
nal world. It has been suggested that the MPFC is the brain region 
underlying the decoupling mechanism (Gallagher and Frith, 2003). 
Thus, schizophrenia patients seem unable to distinguish between 
intentions of others interacting and their own intentions.
Furthermore,  we  propose  that  mentalizing  impairments  in 
schizophrenia are not only due to a diminished activation in the 
intentional network, but also to a specific attitude that these patients 
show, namely their hyper-intentionality. Hyper-ToM is not only 
intended as an attitude to over-attribute intentions to persons, but 
also as a tendency to perceive agency where there is none (Frith, 
2004). The control condition used in our paradigm (i.e., Ph-C) 
allowed us to check for this further question. Hyper-intentionality 
should be accompanied by a lack of deactivation of the intention 
detector when patients were solving stories involving Ph-C. The 
analysis of the beta parameters during all four conditions, showed 
evidence for this idea, as the lack of differential activation in the 
MPFC and in the left TPJ was not only due to decreased activation 
in these regions during the CInt condition, but also to increased 
beta values in the Ph-C condition (see Figure 8).
the patient group; (b) they reflect a consequence of the patients’ 
“hyper-ToM.” “Hyper-ToM” may lead these patients to attribute 
intentions and goals also to objects, i.e., also during our con-
trol condition (Ph-C). In order to better distinguish between 
these two explanations, in future studies it would be helpful to 
include an additional control condition not related to causal 
attribution, to test for impairments depending on more general 
cognitive deficits.
In our study, the control group showed an increasing activation of 
the intentional network (private < prospective < CInt) replicating the 
results from the second experiment of the previous section (Walter 
et al., 2004). In the patient group there was no MPFC activation in 
either condition. Comparing groups directly, significant differences 
in activation patterns were found in the right and left TPJ region and 
in the MPFC. Our main result, in line with our hypothesis, was that 
the neural dysfunction of the intentional network was modulated 
by the type of intention. In particular, for the PInt vs Ph-C condi-
tions, we found no group differences. On the neural level, patients 
with schizophrenia presented no neural dysfunction for this type of 
intention. However, the contrast PSInt vs Ph-C revealed significant 
group differences in the right TJP and the MPFC. Although both 
intentions (PInt and PSInt) share a common element, namely, one 
agent acting in isolation, only PSInt requires the representation of a 
social goal. Also for the CInt comparison there was a group difference 
in the activation of the left TJP (together with the right TJP and the 
MPFC). As already described in the previous section, the left TJP 
was specifically activated for CInt. Taken together, our neuroimaging 
FIguRe 8 | group comparisons between healthy controls and patients with paranoid schizophrenia. Mean activation effects (estimated beta parameters, 
95% confidence interval) of the contrast CInt vs Ph-C for MPFC and left TPJ. The activation effects were extracted from the second level between-group ANOVA. 
Dashed circles indicate the beta parameters for the control condition (Ph-C). Ph-C, Physical causality; CInt, Communicative intention.
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phrenia are more or less permanently in an “online” modus of ToM 
mainly in contexts in which no real intentional agent is involved 
and in which no ToM is required for solving the task. A similar 
result was also found by Blakemore et al. (2003). These authors 
proposed that patients with schizophrenia perceive agency where 
others see none. This could be the reason why patients make as 
many errors in the Ph-C condition as in the intentional conditions 
and explains why patients with schizophrenia do not recognize the 
difference between stories involving intentional agents from stories 
without agents: also moving objects are processed as possessing 
intentional agency.
Within our third study we integrated a theory based on philoso-
phy of mind (the taxonomy of intentions) with clinical evidence 
(the relationship between mentalizing impairment and paranoid 
symptoms). Such integration allowed us to test our predictions 
in patients with schizophrenia. In the next section, we develop a 
similar approach for another clinical group with ToM deficits, i.e., 
people with autism.
preDictions for intentional minDs of patients with 
autism
Autism is a heterogeneous disorder with multiple causes and 
courses and this lead autism experts to coin the term “autis-
tic spectrum disorder” (ASD) to underline that this pathology 
includes different subgroups of patients who differ in terms of 
the pattern of deficits displayed. ASD is diagnosed on the basis 
of early emerging social and communicative impairments and 
rigid and repetitive patterns of behavior and interests. People 
with ASD show striking limitations in social relatedness and 
their interest to interact with other people is often absent; they 
appear distant and display an egocentric attitude also after hav-
ing learnt basic social rules. They have restricted interests and 
may exhibit stereotyped behavior and obsessive tendencies. Their 
ability to communicate is usually compromised and their speech 
tends to be poor and impersonal (Frith, 2001). Population stud-
ies have shown that the prevalence of autism (in its wide range 
of manifestations) is currently estimated between 0.3 and 0.7% 
and that the male to female proportion is approximately three 
to one (Fombonne, 1999).
Language and communication impairments are so central to 
ASD that they have become one of the key symptoms necessary 
to diagnose autism (Tager-Flusberg, 1993). People with ASD do 
not show a profound deficit in many areas of language (e.g., mor-
phology, lexis, syntax), but they often exhibit severe impairments 
in communication (e.g., comprehension of ironic expressions). 
Whereas there is clear behavioral evidence for qualitative impair-
ments in social interaction and communication in ASD, relatively 
little is known about the neural dysfunction underlying these defi-
cits. Functional imaging techniques provide a new tool to explore 
this issue.
One hypothesis to explain social deficits in ASD is that they 
are the result of a specific difficulty in mindreading. People with 
ASD show deficits in the perception of eye gaze, poor eye contact 
during communication, and difficulties accessing information to 
infer the mental state of others. Frith (2001) and Baron-Cohen 
(1995), two of the leading experts in autism research, speak 
about “Mindblindness” in ASD. Abnormalities in brain areas 
primarily involved in social cognition have been reported by 
different studies investigating social processing in patients with 
autism (Brothers, 1990; Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; Castelli et al., 
2002; Pelphrey et al., 2002; Klin et al., 2003; Schultz et al., 2003; 
Gervais et al., 2004; Dalton et al., 2005; Zilbovicius et al., 2006). 
For example, Baron-Cohen et al. (1999) asked individuals with 
ASD to judge people’s inner states from photographs of their eye 
region, and to decide which of two words best described their 
emotional state. Compared to the control group, people with 
autism demonstrated less extensive activation in frontal regions 
and no activation in the amygdala. In another study, Castelli 
et al. (2002) investigated the brain activation of individuals with 
autism and healthy controls using geometric shapes animations. 
Two triangles moved about on a screen in three different con-
ditions: moving randomly, moving in a goal-directed fashion 
(chasing or fighting) and moving interactively with implied 
intentions (coaxing or tricking). Not only MPFC seems to be 
a region involved in ASD social dysfunction, the ASD group 
showed less activation in regions normally involved in social 
perception, e.g., the posterior temporal sulcus (pSTS). Using 
fMRI, Gervais et al. (2004) also discovered that individuals with 
autism failed to activate the pSTS while listening a human voice. 
The pSTS seems to be clearly implicated in ASD (for review 
see Zilbovicius et al., 2006) and this region is highly connected 
with other regions of the “social brain” such as the fusiform face 
area (FFA), an important area also abnormally activated in ASD 
during tasks implicating social cognition (Critchley et al., 2000; 
Schultz et al., 2000; Hubl et al., 2003).
The literature investigating social dysfunction in ASD has also 
provided an alternative approach to the mindreading hypoth-
esis: the “broken mirror” theory (Williams et al., 2001; Iacoboni 
and Dapretto, 2006; Ramachandran and Oberman, 2006), which 
was formulated following the discovery of a class of neurons in 
monkeys that fire when an action is either executed or observed. 
A similar mechanism seems to exist also in the human brain and 
is supported by two main brain regions: the inferior section of 
the precentral gyrus plus the posterior part of the inferior frontal 
gyrus (IFG), and the inferior parietal lobule, including the cortex 
located inside the intraparietal sulcus. These regions form the 
so called mirror neurons system (MNS; for a recent review see 
Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010). This mechanism seems to provide 
one of the neural bases that connects individuals to each other 
in form of social interactions (Adenzato and Garbarini, 2006; 
Brüne and Brune-Cohrs, 2006; Hari and Kujala, 2009). It has 
been suggested that an impairment in this mechanism may be one 
of the salient deficits that impair the ability of individuals with 
ASD to interact with other people: MNS is principally involved 
in imitation, and the dysfunction of the MNS in ASD might be 
mainly responsible for a failure in imitation and, because of this, 
contribute to the later difficulty in understanding others’ inten-
tions and emotions.
To sum up, there are two current competitive theories on the 
origins of the social deficits observed in ASD: the “mindblindness 
theory” and the “broken mirror” theory, both concerned with the 
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Different domains of investigation may sometimes cross-fertilize 
each other in order to promote progress in general knowledge. In 
this paper we presented the case of the interplay between philoso-
phy of mind and cognitive neuroscience.
We regard such cross-fertilization as a fruitful exchange between 
different epistemological approaches to knowledge, offering it as 
a paradigmatic case of modern science strategy. We used fMRI 
experiments with healthy individuals to test the predictions of 
a theory about prior intentions well assessed both in philosophy 
of mind and in cognitive science. Then, we used results obtained 
from people with psychopathological impairments and choose 
as  extremes  the  cases  of  autism  and  paranoid  schizophrenia 
to test the theoretical predictions we derived by philosophy of 
mind and strengthened through neuroscientific investigation on 
normal subjects.
Brook (2009) distinguishes between philosophy in cognitive 
research and philosophy of cognitive research. When philoso-
phy plays a role in cognitive science, it is usually philosophy 
of mind and language: Brook tout court refers to it as cognitive 
philosophy. On the generate-and-test picture of science, Brook 
adds a third activity, interpretation, to the popperian context of 
hypothesis discovery (big theories) and hypothesis justification 
(experiments). In this paper, we used philosophy of mind and 
language for hypothesis discovery (i.e., the taxonomy sketched 
in Figure 3), then we summarized a series of fMRI experiments 
dedicated to justify the taxonomy presented. The interpretation 
of the results allowed us to draw a broad picture encompass-
ing the recognition of intentions in healthy and pathological 
mind brains.
As a final methodological note, we acknowledge that although 
neuroimaging techniques provide important information on the 
involvement of one or more brain areas in the performance of a 
specific cognitive process, currently available neuroimaging meth-
ods do not allow for clear conclusions on whether the same areas 
are actually required to perform the cognitive task related to the 
cognitive process examined, i.e., whether they are not only involved 
but also necessary. Therefore, in accordance with this point of view, 
our future efforts to test our theory will be based on   convergent 
investigation based on different methodological methods, such 
as the analysis of how people with real (neuropsychological) and 
virtual brain “lesions” (the latter induced by Transcranic Magnetic 
Stimulation)  performed  in  our  experimental  protocols.  These 
investigations will help us to reach more robust conclusions on 
the functional role of the brain areas involved in the intentional 
network  and  on  the  taxonomy  of  different  types  of  intention 
herein presented.
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atypical patterns of neural activation observed in individuals with 
ASD when processing social cognition tasks. The brain regions 
involved by these two hypotheses have distinct but complemen-
tary functions for the recognition of others’ intentions (De Lange 
et al., 2008). However, Hamilton (2009) sustains that neither of 
these two approaches is sufficient for explaining all the difficulties 
shown by people with ASD; she concludes that a better formula-
tion of the current theories and better empirical data discriminat-
ing precisely between goals, intentions, outcomes, and desires are 
needed. We agree with Hamilton, and we think that our theoreti-
cal distinction among varieties of intention could contribute to 
understand more clearly the social brain dysfunction in ASD. In 
fact, checking into the MNS experimental paradigms, we found 
that these studies often implied actions like “grasping, reaching, 
drinking, cleaning” (e.g., Boria et al., 2009). This kind of stimuli 
fully corresponds with those probed by our PInt condition. In 
contrast, most of the stimuli used by the “mindblindness theory” 
implicate short stories with interacting people or animated shapes 
(e.g., Castelli et al., 2002), i.e., our CInt condition. Thus, the differ-
ent paradigms adopted by the two approaches could also be read 
as diverging in that they use different types of intention (private 
or social), and this could explain why they linked the social brain 
dysfunction of ASD to different brain areas. We believe that our 
model may contribute to the debate on the neural dysfunction 
involved in social cognition in ASD. In particular, we predict that 
adopting a paradigm separating social from private intentions, it 
would be possible to identify different dysfunctional brain regions 
in patients with autism: “ToM region” like MPFC for social inten-
tions, and IFG (a mirror neurons area) for private intentions. 
Actually, our group does not yet have final data that may validate 
this assumption, and further studies on the recognition of differ-
ent types of intention are needed. However, our model proposes 
an innovative perspective that may help us to refine our theories 
of social dysfunction in ASD.
The development of brain mapping methods, their application 
to normal subjects and their clinical use with patients have had a 
profound impact on our understanding of normal brain function 
in healthy individuals and of its alteration in patients with mind/
brain disorders, i.e., patients with autism and schizophrenia. In an 
exhaustive review, Crespi and Badcock (2008) positioned autistic 
and psychotic spectrum disorders at the opposite ends of a contin-
uum of cognitive architectures ranging from mechanistic to men-
talistic cognition. These authors claimed that people with autism 
have reduced mentalistic skills (i.e., they are “hypo-  mentalistic”), 
while people with schizophrenia displays opposite features (i.e., 
they are “hyper-mentalistic”). Adopting a similar approach, we 
claim that the impairments in understanding others’ intentions 
exhibited by paranoid patients and autistic patients, respectively, 
can be considered as the two extremes of a continuum.
We believe that our model may enlarge the knowledge on the 
neurobiological bases of intention processing, and of its relation 
to social cognition in various forms of psychopathology. By fol-
lowing this line, researchers and clinicians may be able to better 
understand the nature of neuropsychological and psychopatho-
logical deficits in these disorders, and hopefully to formulate more 
adequate clinical descriptions.
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